Anfänge der Moral #4

The object of this Essay is to explain as clearly as I am able grounds of an opinion which I have held from the very earliest period when I had formed any opinions at all on social political matters, and which, instead of being weakened or modified, has been constantly growing stronger by the progress reflection and the experience of life. That the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the two sexes — the legal subordination of one sex to the other — is wrong itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other.

The very words necessary to express the task I have undertaken, show how arduous it is. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the difficulty of the case must lie in the insufficiency or obscurity of the grounds of reason on which my convictions. The difficulty is that which exists in all cases in which there is a mass of feeling to be contended against.

[aus: J.S. Mill: The Subjection of Women (1869), Ch. 1]

Anfänge der Moral #3

Offenbar finden wir nicht nur manche Handlungen (wie die Verfolgung von Juden oder Homosexuellen) moralisch falsch, sondern ebenso die diesen Handlungen zugrunde liegenden Gewissensurteile. Dem Gewissen ist als Maßstab moralisch richtigen Handelns also nicht zu vertrauen; es kann “irren”. Daraus aber folgt, dass die Berufung auf das Gewissen die systematische Suche nach den rationalen Grundlagen moralischen Verhaltens nicht ersetzen kann. Wer an diesen Grundlagen ernsthaft interessiert ist, kann sich die Mühe einer ethischen Untersuchung nicht ersparen.

(Hoerster, Norbert 2003: Ethik und Interesse, Stuttgart, S.14.)

Anfänge der Moral #2

“Strawson describes two kinds of philosophy, descriptive, and revisionary. Descriptive philosophy gives reasons for what we instinctively assume, and explains and justifies the unchanging central core in our beliefs about ourselves, and the world we inhabit. I have great respect for descriptive philosophy. But, by temperament, I am a revisionist. Except in my dreary Chapter 1, where I cannot avoid repeating what has been shown to be true, I try to challenge what we assume. Philosophers should not only interpret our beliefs; when they are false, they should change them.”

(Parfit, Derek 1984: Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, Oxford, S.x.)

Der letzte Satz scheint mir zitierenswerter zu sein als das allzuoft zitierte Vorbild. Es kommt nicht auf das Verändern an sich an, sondern auf das Verändern aus guten Gründen.

Anfänge der Moral #1 – R.M. Hare: “Moral Thinking”

Der blinde Hund lebt seinen Sammlertrieb aus: Ich sammle ab jetzt hier Zitate aus den ersten Seiten von moralphilosophischen Büchern, die in irgendeiner Weise die Bedeutsamkeit des Nachdenkens über moralische Fragen oder die Problemlage illustriert, auf die das jeweilige Buch eine Reaktion darstellt. Ich weiß noch nicht, ob da was Interessantes rauskommt, aber man kann’s ja einfach mal versuchen.

Ich fange an mit dem 1981 erschienenen Buch Moral Thinking. Its Levels, Method and Point von R.M. Hare, dessen Auftakt mir aus irgendeinem Grund enorm imponiert hat:

“I offer this book to the public now rather than later, not because I think it needs no improvement, but because of a sense of urgency – a feeling that if these ideas were understood, philosophers might do more to help resolve important practical issues. These are issues over which people are prepared to fight and kill one another; and it may be that unless some way is found of talking about them rationally and with hope of agreement, violence will finally engulf the world. Philosophers have in recent years become increasingly aware of the role that they might have in preventing this; but they have lacked any clear idea of what constitutes a good argument in practical questions. Often they are content with appeals to their own or others’ intuitions and prejudices; and since it is these prejudices which fuelled the violence in the first place, this is not going to help.”

(R.M. Hare: Moral Thinking, Oxford 1981, S. 1)